Federal Agency Compensation of Intervenors by Steeg, Robert M
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 4 Article 6
1-1-1976
Federal Agency Compensation of Intervenors
Robert M. Steeg
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert M. Steeg, Federal Agency Compensation of Intervenors, 5 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 697 (1976),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol5/iss4/6
FEDERAL AGENCY COMPENSATION OF 
INTERVENORS 
Robert M. Steeg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal administrative agencies are vitally important guardians 
of the quality of our environment and the efficiency of our use of 
natural resources. 1 Ideally, these agencies are intended to function 
as disinterested bodies of experts serving the public.2 Although some 
may contend that the agencies perform this task well, the over-
whelming weight of opinion is to the contrary.3 Federal administra-
tive regulation, including that covering environmental affairs, often 
does not reflect vigorous, continuing consideration of the needs and 
concerns of the general public. 
Increased participation in the administrative process by members 
of the public is frequently heralded as a means of stimulating more 
responsive administrative decision-making. 4 Both Congress5 and the 
* Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
I Some agencies, such as the Federal Power Commission, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission deal exclusively with such matters. More-
over, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970), directs 
all federal agencies to include consideration of the values of environmental preservation in 
their decision-making. 
2 See R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 33-39 (1971). 
3 Compare Hearings on S. 2715 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. 21 (testimony of Joseph Swidler) and 45 (testimony of William Cuddy) (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Operations Hearings] with Hearings on S. 2715 Before the Subcomm. 
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 2 (remarks by Sen. Kennedy) (1976) [hereinafter cited as Administrative Hearings]; 
Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 361 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Gellhorn]; Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public 
Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
Cramton]; and Murphy & Hoffman, Current Models for Improving Public Representation 
in the Administrative Process, 28 AD. L. REV. 391, 392-93 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Murphy 
& Hoffman]. 
• Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 361; Cramton, supra note 3, at 527-30. 
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courts6 have recognized the importance of increased participation, 
and federal administrative agencies, responding to pressure from 
these two quarters, have in recent years provided greater opportun-
ity for public intervention in their proceedings.7 
Many potential intervenors, however, are financially unable to 
participate.8 The costs of doing so are great, 9 especially the fees for 
attorneys and expert witnesses. 1o External sources of funds to meet 
these costs are limited. Foundations generally provide only "seed 
money" for selected projects,11 while private donations or group 
membership fees are extremely difficult to raise and to maintain. 12 
As long as public intervenors remain financially foreclosed from 
participation, their potential contribution to the quality of adminis-
trative decision-making will remain unrealized. Several methods 
are now being proposed for increasing the representation of the gen-
eral public before federal agencies, including: agency cost-shifting, 
intra-agency public representation, a federal public advocacy 
agency, legal aid programs for intervenors, and agency compensa-
tion of intervenors.13 
This article provides a brief analysis and comparsion of these 
various methods of increasing public representation, and concludes 
that direct agency compensation of intervenors appears to be the 
most promising. The major issues raised by this alternative are then 
examined in detail. The examination focuses on the development of 
comprehensive legislation to guide federal agency compensation of 
• See Administrative Hearings, supra note 3, at 271-73 (bibliography of congressional 
hearings on public participation in federal agency proceedings). 
• Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003-04 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966); see Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1964), 
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
7 Note, Federal Agency Assistance to Impecunious Intervenors, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 
1817-18 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Agency Assistance]. 
• See Administrative Hearings, supra note 3, at 37-38 (testimony of Phillip Sparks and 
Diane Worthington); Citizens VOICE, Facilitating Public Participation at the Federal Power 
Commission 12-15, 26-30 (1976), reprinted in Administrative Hearings, supra note 3, at 471, 
483-86, 497-501 [hereinafter cited as Citizens VOICE Report]. 
• Gellhom, supra note 3, at 389-99; Cramton, supra note 3, at 538-41. A utility company 
typically pays an estimated $250,000 to carry through a licensing proceeding at the NRC. 
Administrative Hearings, supra note 3, at 52 (testimony of Tersh Boasberg) . 
• 0 Agency Assistance, supra note 7, at 1819. The use of one expert witness at an FPC 
ratemaking proceeding can "easily" cost $10,000 to $20,000. Citizens VOICE Report, supra 
note 8, at 55. 
II COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC 
INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA, 221, 226-44 (1976) . 
•• Id. at 221, 244-61. 
.3 See Part m, infra, for a discussion of these methods. 
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intervenors,14 with particular reference to one such proposal, S. 
2715,15 a bill which reached the floor of the Senate in July, 1976, but 
was not voted upon before the close of the legislative session in 
October. S. 2715 represents Congress' starting point on agency com-
pensation of intervenors. Its proponents introduced similar legisla-
tion as soon as the Senate reconvened in January, 1977.18 
II. THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Essential to the analysis which follows is an understanding of 
what public participation contributes to the administrative process. 
One possible benefitl7 is that a widespread increase in such partici-
pation might boost flagging public confidencel8 in administrative 
decision-making. Yet because the general public is often unaware 
of who has participated in administrative decisions,19 it is unlikely 
that any nationwide effect on public confidence would be felt. 
A second possible benefit is that the very presence of public inter-
venors may incline agency staffs to be more thorough in their ana-
lyses and may cause agency decision-makers to articulate more 
clearly and precisely the reasons for their decisions. 20 However, such 
effect would be minimal whenever agencies are already attempting 
to make careful, clear decisions. Further, the effect on a recalcitrant 
agency will depend on how intervention is actually structured into 
agency decision-making.21 
" Individual agencies, acting either under congressional direction or upon their own initia-
tive, might attempt to implement the agency compensation concept. The analysis conducted 
here is applicable to the design and evaluation of any such system of agency compensation. 
15 S. 2715, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The bill was introduced by Senator Edward Ken-
nedy and cosponsored by 16 other senators. It was favorably reported out of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, S. REp. No. 94-863, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Committee Reportj. The Senate Government Operations Committee considered it without 
objection, and it was ordered to be placed on the calendar July 2, 1976. 
,. S. 270, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). As of this writing, S. 270 resolves the major issues 
concerning agency compensation which are discussed in Part IV, infra, in substantially the 
same manner as did its predecessor, S. 2715. In some instances, S. 270 contains refinements 
or additions which successfully resolve some of the problems raised in this article. 
17 Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 36!. 
.. Committee Report, supra note 15, at 2; see Boasberg, Hewes, Klores & Kass, Report to 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Policy Issues Raised by Intervenor Requests for Finan-
cial Assistance in NRC Proceedings 103 (1975), reprinted in Administrative Hearings, supra 
note 3, at 331, 391 [hereinafter cited as Boasberg Reportj. 
10 Id. at 104. 
21 Id. at 96-100; Jacks, The Public and the Peaceful Atom: Participation in AEC Regulatory 
Proceedings, 52 TEx. L. REv. 466, 502-03 (1974). 
21 See Green, Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing: The Great Delusion, 
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A third possible benefit consists of the substantive recommenda-
tions of public participants. There are two elements of this contribu-
tion. First, public participants bring important factual information 
to the decision-maker's attention, either through presentation of 
original evidence or cross-examination of other parties' witnesses. 
The information may concern either an existing issue or one raised 
by the public participant. For example, an intervenor's disclosure 
that a developer planned to build a community for 30,000 people 
within two miles of the proposed site of a nuclear power plant 
prompted the Atomic Energy Commission to withdraw its initial 
approval of the site. 22 Similarly, after two public interest groups 
uncovered several studies showing that the cost of refining unleaded 
gasoline is about the same as that of refining regular gasoline, the 
Federal Energy Administration substantially altered its regulation 
permitting refiners to sell unleaded gasoline at premium prices. 2:1 
One agency commissioner recently attested to the value of such 
contributions: "In hearing after hearing, the industry provides tech-
nical witnesses who can persuasively argue their position. This evi-
dence I consider to be important, but it is incomplete. It must be 
supplemented and balanced by technical arguments made by the 
public. "24 
The second major element of public participants' substantive 
contribution is the presentation of a viewpoint or perspective not 
otherwise available to the decision-maker. That is, a legal or factual 
argument is presented which places a unique emphasis or interpre-
tation on either existing or newly-raised issues. For example, in 1963 
the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference urged the Federal 
Power Commission to consider aesthetic values and harms in a 
licensing proceeding. The group's right to present such a perspective 
was eventually vindicated by a federal court of appeals. 25 Similarly, 
in the Federal Trade Commission's recent hearings on private voca-
tional schools, a California consumer group presented testimony 
reflecting an "intimate and first-hand familiarity" with the problem 
15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 503, 516 (1974). 
72 Jacks, supra note 20, at 503. 
23 Hearings on Implementation of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 Before 
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1975) (testimony 
of Peter Shuck). 
" Admini.strative Hearings, supra note 3, at 92 (testimony of David Pittle, Commissioner, 
Consumer Product Safety Commission). 
25 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 
384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
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being examined by the agency-a perspective which the Commis-
sion staff could not possess. 26 An FTC official recognized the import-
ance of intervenors who have had "a different perspective which 
made different information relevant .... the analysis produced by 
this additional point of view is as important as anything else."27 
Clearly the presentation of information and viewpoints consti-
tutes public participants' primary contribution to administrative 
proceedings. Any method for increasing public participation must 
be designed to foster these specific benefits. 
III. ALTERNATE METHODS OF INCREASING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
A. Agency Cost-Shifting 
One means28 of increasing public participation is for agencies to 
require that the costs of such participation be borne by the other 
parties in an administrative proceeding, in a manner analogous to 
the judicial practice of involuntary fee-shifting. Traditionally, fed-
eral courts have departed from the American rule against fee-
shifting only in the following select situations: the plaintiff has se-
cured a ruling which works to the direct financial advantage of 
persons in addition to himself; the defendant has been drawn into 
a lawsuit brought or conducted in bad faith; or the plaintiff has 
acted as a private attorney general, vindicating important public 
policies through private litigation.29 
Seldom in administrative proceedings is either a common finan-
cial benefit created or a participant's bad faith so clear as to justify 
cost-shifting. Thus, only the private attorney general rationale 
seems of practical significance. 3o However, the Supreme Court re-
" Administrative Hearings, supra note 3, at 8 (testimony of Elizabeth Lederer). 
27 Operations Hearings, supra note 3, at 32 (testimony of James Delong, Assistant Director 
for Special Projects, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission) (emphasis 
added). 
" The methods discussed here are comprehensive, large-scale programs. Other means 
which are aimed at reducing specific kinds of administrative costs-e.g., transcript costs-
are not discussed here. Such specific proposals are discussed in Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 
390-93; Cramton, supra note 3, at 539-41. 
.. See Defrosting the Alyeska Chill: The Future of Attorneys Fees Awards In Environ-
mental Litigation, 5 ENv. AFr. 297, 315-25 (1976). 
30 Agency Assistance, supra note 7, at 1823-24, which briefly raises and dispenses with two 
other theories which might guide administrative cost-shifting: a pure "deep-pocket" ap-
proach, and a theory that because a participant in an administrative proceeding seeks a 
governmental privilege, he may be required to defray the costs of needy intervenors in the 
same proceeding. 
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cently declared that courts may not invoke this doctrine without 
express statutory authority,31 and one federal court of appeals has 
extended this prohibition to cover involuntary cost-shifting by ad-
ministrative agencies. 32 
Even if Congress provided such statutory authority, the private 
attorney general rationale is of limited usefulness as a means of 
stimulating widespread public participation. Since cost-shifting 
requires some administrative participants to bear both their own 
costs and those of others, invocation of the private attorney general 
theory should be confined to those situations in which intervenors 
force other participants to comply with a clearly and narrowly de-
fined legislative policy. 33 Cost-shifting, and the public participation 
which it might stimulate, will thus be unavailable in a large number 
of administrative proceedings. 
B. Intra-Agency Public Representation 
A variety of proposals assign to federal agencies themselves the 
affirmative duty of ensuring that the public is represented in their 
decision-making. The agency's role in these proposals may range 
from supplying its staff attorneys to represent selected intervenors34 
to designating agency personnel who are to identify important 
"public" concerns or opinions and present them in agency proceed-
ings. 35 
A critical shortcoming common to these proposals is that any 
additional information and viewpoints which reach agency decision-
makers are filtered through staff members subject to pressure both 
from inside the agency and from the regulated industry.36 This 
shortcoming is apparent, for example, in the Civil Aeronautics 
Board's Office of Consumer Advocate, whose independence rests 
solely on the assurances of the Board's Chairman and General 
Counsel, and whose participation is limited to "appropriate" pro-
ceedings subject to Board approvalY Further, agency programs 
which provide institutional representation of the "public interest" 
tend to bring a single set of additional information and viewpoints 
" Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
32 Turner v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
33 Agency Assistance, supra note 7, at 1824-25 . 
.. Cramton, supra note 3, at 545; Murphy & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 402-08. 
35 Murphy & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 404-05 . 
.. Cramton, supra note 3, at 544; Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 397. 
37 Murphy & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 403-05. 
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to a proceeding, rather than the many different ones which would 
more accutately reflect the pluralism of opinion which makes up the 
"public interest." 
C. Federal Public Advocacy Agency 
Another method of increasing public participation in administra-
tive proceedings is the establishment of a separate federal agency 
to represent the public's interest in administrative matters. Gener-
ally speaking, this agency will represent positions which it finds, 
after an evaluation of the needs and views of the general public, to 
be important and currently inadequately represented. 3s Assignment 
of this responsibility to an independent federal agency encourages 
the development of consistent policy positions based on a nation-
wide perspective and the continued advocacy of these positions in 
administrative forums. 3D 
If may be difficult for a federal public interest advocate to remain 
politically independent.4° Moreover, the federal advocate will leave 
a great deal of potentially valuable information and viewpoints un-
presented to federal administrative agencies. At times the advocate 
will decline to take part in a proceeding in which several interested 
groups would like to participate but lack the necessary funds. And 
when the federal advocate does participate in a proceeding, it will 
usually present only one additional set of information and view-
points, as was the case with the intra-agency public advocate. 
D. Legal Services For Intervenors 
Several proposals have been advanced which would eliminate 
high attorneys' fees as a barrier to administrative participation by 
making legal services available to potential intervenors unable to 
pay for them. These arrangements have the distinct advantage of 
enabling intervenors to speak for themselves, thus assuring vigorous 
and uncompromised presentations of their positions. 
The first of these methods would create a system of government-
funded legal aid offices providing administrative counsel to poten-
tial intervenors. 41 However, such a scheme would involve a large 
addition to the federal bureaucracy and would require substantial 
30 Agency Assistance, supra note 7, at 1821; Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 398. 
" Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 398 . 
•• Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1103·04 (1971). 
" Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 397; Cramton, supra note 3, at 541·42. 
704 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:697 
appropriations. This approach has yet to be incorporated into a 
specific proposal. 
A second method suggests that private attorneys donate legal 
services to public intervenor groups. ~2 Regular programs of such 
assistance might be developed through various bar associations. ~3 
However, no comprehensive scheme for increasing public participa-
tion can be built upon such largesse alone. 44 As one attorney engaged 
in pro bono work remarked, "law firm resources will not even come 
close to meeting the need."45 
E. Direct Agency Compensation of Intervenors 
A final means of increasing public representation before adminis-
trative agencies is direct agency payment of the costs incurred by 
selected intervenors. 46 This scheme retains the feature that inter-
venors speak for themselves. In addition, compensation will be 
available in a wide range of administrative proceedings,47 and may 
be awarded to several intervenors in the same proceeding. As a 
result, a variety of public information and viewpoints can reach 
numerous administrative decision-makers. 
In the absence of an explicit statutory declaration, the authority 
for federal agencies to compensate intervenors must be found in 
each agency's broad statutory mandate. Agencies have differed 
about whether they possess such authority. For example, in 1971, 
the FTC acknowledged its responsibility to ensure that impover-
ished respondents obtain counsel. 48 Two years later, the Comptroller 
General of the United States decided that the FTC could pay the 
transcript, travel and witness costs of needy respondents and inter-
venors, on the theory that "the use of Commission appropriations 
to assure ... full preparation of cases by impecunious litigants 
would constitute a proper exercise of administrative discretion re-
.. GeJlhorn, supra note 3, at 395. Private attorneys frequently donate their services to 
various clients; such work is designated as pro bono publico (for the public good). 
U See Committee Report, supra note 15, at 39 (reference to a program currently being 
developed by the Federal Communications Bar Association) . 
.. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC 
INTEREST LAW 281-306 (1976). 
I' Administrative Hearings, supra note 3, at 61 (testimony of Samuel Berger). 
II Grounds for selection is an important, disputed issue, analyzed in text at notes 74-97, 
infra. 
" The agency cost-shifting and federal public advocate schemes reach only a limited num-
ber of proceedings. See text at notes 32 and 40-41, supra. 
" American Chinchilla Corp., 76 FTC 1016, 1037 (1969). 
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garding the expenditure of appropriated funds."4u In 1974 Congress 
enacted legislation to guide the FTC's exercise of this power.50 
By contrast, the Federal Power Commission has squarely denied 
that it has the authority to compensate intervenors, and in Greene 
County Planning Board v. FPC51 the court refused to order the FPC 
to do so. Initially, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission52 also disa-
vowed any authority to award such compensation,53 but in 1975 it 
reexamined this position in a rulemaking proceeding.54 In response 
to an NRC inquiry, the Comptroller General issued a decision in 
February, 1976, which followed the approach of the 1972 FTC opin-
ion and stated that the NRC, in the exercise of its administrative 
discretion, could compensate interested parties whose participation 
the agency considered necessary to the discharge of its statutory 
duties.55 The Comptroller General's intrepretation of the NRC's au-
thority was consistent with that of both Congress56 and the agency 
itself. 57 The decision did not compel, but merely allowed the NRC 
to compensate intervenors, and was therefore consistent with 
Greene County. 
Thus a legal theory has developed that federal administrative 
agencies, exercising their broad residual powers to achieve regula-
tory objectives, may compensate needy intervenors with agency 
funds. 58 This theory received strong support in a letter written by 
the Comptroller General to Representative John Moss in May, 
1976,59 which declared that the rationale of the Comptroller's NRC 
decision allowing agency compensation was equally applicable to 
nine additional federal agencies, including the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and the Federal Power Commission. The Court of 
.. Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General, to Myles J. Kirkpatrick, Chairman, 
Federal Trade Commission, B·139703 (July 24, 1972), reprinted in Administrative Hearings, 
supra note 3, at 281. 
50 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (Supp. V 1975) . 
• , 455 F.2d 412, 426 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). 
'2 Until 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission . 
., See Citizens For A Safe Environment v. AEC, 489 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1974) . 
•• 40 Fed. Reg. 37056·57 (1975) . 
•• Decision of the Comptroller General, B·92288 (Feb. 19, 1976), reprinted in Administra· 
tive Hearings, supra note 3, at 283 . 
•• H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93·1445, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974) . 
., Consumers Power Company, RAI·74·11·820 (Nov. 20, 1974) (Dkt. No. 50·155) . 
.. See Agency Assistance, supra note 7, at 1827·30 . 
•• Letter from R.F. Keller, Comptroller General, to Rep. J. Moss, Chairman, Oversight and 
Investigations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, B· 
180224 (May 10, 1976). 
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Appeals for the Second Circuit recently ordered the FPC to reeval-
uate its denial of authority to compensate intervenors in light of the 
Comptroller General's pronouncement, holding that "the FPC now 
appears to have authorization to pay intervenors' expenses" under 
its general statutory mandate.50 
The Comptroller General's letter, however, urged Congress to 
pass legislation to guide the crucial agency decisions of whether and 
how to compensate intervenors. 51 The Second Circuit also noted 
that comprehensive legislation in this area may be necessary.62 In 
the absence of such legislation, the status and form of agency com-
pensation of intervenors will remain unsettled and uneven. A com-
prehensive legislative program for agency compensation of interven-
ors would ensure regular exposure of all administrative decision-
makers to beneficial public participation and would guide prospec-
tive intervenors currently faced with a crazy-quilt of pronounce-
ments by federal officials on the availability of compensation. S. 
271553 attempted to meet this important need. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE COMPENSATION ApPROACH: S. 2715 
The provisions of S. 2715 cover not only compensation of interven-
ors by administrative agencies, but also compensation by federal 
courts of parties seeking judicial review of agency actions. The bill 
would amend the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)64 by adding 
a § 558a providing for administrative compensation and a § 707 
covering judicial compensation.55 Each of these programs would be 
funded for a three year experimental period, with $10,000,000 per 
fiscal year authorized for administrative compensation and "such 
sums as may be necessary" to provide for judicial compensation.66 
The proposed § 558a provides a focal point for the examination of 
the following major issues:67 (1) the scope of the agency compensa-
.0 Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, Nos. 76-4151 and 76-4153, slip op. at 827-28 (2d 
Cir., Dec. 8, 1976) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Greene County II]. See 45 
U.S.L.W. 2319 (1977). 
" Letter from R.F. Keller, supra note 59. 
02 Greene County II, supra note 60, at 829 n.6. 
" S. 2715, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See note 15, supra . 
.. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970). 
" The plan for agency compensation is set forth in Section Two of S. 2715; judicial compen-
sation is dealt with in Section Three . 
.. S. 2715, Section Five. 
" S. 2715 addresses more facets of the agency compensation problem than can adequately 
be treated here. Numerous specific matters remain, e.g., the question of how an agency shall 
allocate its funds among its various proceedings, which is discussed in Boasberg Report, supra 
note 18, at 195-201. 
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tion method; (2) the criteria for eligibility of intervenors; (3) prob-
lems of administration; (4) the availability of judicial review of 
compensation decisions; and (5) the possibility of delay caused by 
the compensation program. 
A. Scope 
The scope of agency compensation defines the kinds of proceed-
ings in which compensation will be available. Debate in this area 
centers on whether adjudicatory proceedings should be included 
within the scope of a compensation program. S. 2715 provides that 
all rule making, ratemaking, and licensing proceedings, and "such 
other proceedings involving issues which relate directly to health, 
safety, civil rights, the environment, and the economic well being 
of consumers in the marketplace," are included.68 Critics charge 
that public intervenors have no place in adversarial proceedings69 
and point out that the FTC's current statutory authority to award 
compensation70 is limited to rulemakings. 
The resolution of this question should turn not on which label is 
applied to a proceeding, but on whether additional public informa-
tion or viewpoints is needed. When the issues of a proceeding in-
volve policy or precedent of consequence to the general public, the 
decision-maker will benefit from the additional facts and unique 
viewpoints which affected public participants can supply.71 
S. 2715, indeed, follows this prescription. Rulemaking, ratemak-
ing, and licensing proceedings, all of which are included within the 
scope of the bill's program, are almost always of considerable conse-
quence to the general public. Moreover, by allowing compensation 
in any "other proceedings" involving issues which "relate directly" 
to several broad areas of public concern,72 the bill ensures that addi-
tional public information and viewpoints will be presented when-
ever there is a substantial connection73 between the public's welfare 
.. S. 2715, Section Two, § (b)(2) of the proposed APA § 558a . 
.. Operations Hearings, supra note 3, at 25 (testimony of Joseph Swidler) and 47 (testimony 
of William Cuddy). 
'" 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1) (Supp. V 1975). 
71 This view is in harmony with that ofthe Administrative Conference of the United States 
and other commentators. Public Participation in Administrative Hearings, Recommendation 
28, 2 RECOMMENDATIONS & REpORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
35 (1970-72); Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 369-71; Murphy & Hoffman, supra note 3, at 397. 
" See text at note 68, supra. The areas mentioned in S. 2715 encompass most important 
public issues and give needed guidance to those making decisions concerning compensation. 
73 Clearly the phrase "relate directly" is not meant to refer only to the immediacy of the 
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and the issues involved in an adjudication. Absent such a connec-
tion, the public consequences of administrative action are small, 
and the need for participation is accordingly diminished. 
B. Eligibility 
The eligibility of an intervenor for administrative compensation 
depends upon satisfaction of two requirements: the applicant's con-
tribution to the agency proceeding and his need for judicial assis-
tance. Statutory guidelines for agency compensation of intervenors 
should establish specific minimum standards to measure 
compliance with these basic requirements.74 
1. Applicant contribution 
Under the standard established by S. 2715, compensation is ap-
propriate if: 
the person represents an interest the representation of which contrib-
uted or can reasonably be expected to contribute substantially to a fair 
determination of the proceeding, taking into account the number and 
complexity of the issues presented, the importance of public participa-
tion, and the need for representation of a fair balance of interests. 75 
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 2715 attempts 
to explain how this standard is to be applied. The agency is to 
consider the quality of the applicant's (actual or expected) presen-
tation, and is to award compensation if the applicant's representa-
tion of an interest would "assist the agency in reaching a fair deter-
mination" of issues which are of "some complexity," of "significant 
public concern," and "not already adequately represented" in the 
proceeding.76 
This proposed statutory standard for eligibility has been criti-
cized as too permissive. Critics claim that the current eligibility 
relationship between the issues at hand and the five public concerns mentioned. The phrase 
also encompasses the strength of the relationship. See Committee Report, supra note 15, at 
18. 
" Because of financial constraints, agencies may find it impossible to compensate all 
applicants who meet the minimum statutory requirements, and must then exercise their 
discretion to compensate those applicants whose participation contributes most to the admin-
istrative proceeding. Detailed analysis of how an individual agency should allocate its funds 
among various proceedings or among eligible intervenors within one proceeding is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
15 S. 2715, Section Two, § (d)(l) of the proposed APA § 558a. 
" Committee Report, supra note 15, at 19. 
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criteria for compensation for the FTC are narrower and more appro-
priateY The FTC is authorized to compensate any person who rep-
resents an interest 
(i) which would not otherwise be adequately represented in such 
proceedings, and (ii) representation of which is necessary for a 
fair determination of the rulemaking proceeding taken as a 
whole. 78 
Regulations promulgated by the FTC pursuant to this statute spec-
ify two factors to be considered in deciding whether representation 
is "necessary" -the "number and complexity of the issues in-
volved" in the proceeding and "the importance of a fair, balanced 
representation of all interests" therein. 79 
Although the criteria of S. 2715 appear to be somewhat more 
permissive than those currently governing the FTC's awards of com-
pensation, the Committee Report on S. 2715 and the FTC regula-
tions show that in practice the two standards will be effectively the 
same. The factors to be taken into account in applying the "sub-
stantial contribution" test of S. 2715 are nearly identical to those 
which the FTC considers in determining whether an applicant's 
participation is "necessary" and not duplicative of other parties' 
presentations. 
Neither of these two standards, however, provides an entirely 
appropriate measure of the advisability of compensating an appli-
cant, for neither one effectively tests the contributions which an 
applicant might make to the administrative process. Both stan-
dards turn on the identification of the "interest" represented by an 
applicant. Yet frequently several applicants representing the same 
general "interest" will seek to present very different sets of informa-
tion or viewpoints, each of which would be valuable to the adminis-
trative decision-maker. Both tests instruct the awarding agency to 
assess the importance of an applicant's participation. However, 
they set out factors which are often irrelevant to this assessment. 
For example, a public intervenor may have information which 
would be vital to the determination of a given issue, even if that 
issue is not very "complex." 
If the primary contribution of a public participant consists of 
77 See, e.g., Operations Hearings, supra note 3, at 8 (statement of Sen. Allen). 
" 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(I)(A) (Supp. V, 1975). 
" 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(d)(l) (1976). 
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information and viewpoints, then this should be the sole benchmark 
of eligibility. The awarding agency should be directed by statute to 
consider whether an applicant "has adequately presented or can 
adequately present relevant information or viewpoints not otherwise 
presented in the proceeding."80 This proposed standard states 
clearly how the awarding agency is to determine eligibility, and it 
limits eligibility to those intervenors whose participation can lead 
to more responsive administrative decisions. 81 
2. Applicant financial need 
S. 2715 poses alternative tests of an applicant's financial need. 
One test asks an applicant to demonstrate his financial inability to 
participate effectively.82 The other asks whether the economic inter-
est of the individual applicant (or, if the applicant is a group, the 
separate economic interests of a substantial majority of its mem-
bers) is small in comparison to the costs of effective participation.83 
This test, the Committee Report explains,84 is intended to allow 
participation by those whose economic stake is so small as not to 
justify their paying for intervention. 
Criticism has been levelled at these criteria, again on the grounds 
that they are too lenient. Critics allege that the first test does not 
provide specific devices to assure agencies of the actual financial 
condition of applicants,85 and that the second test will allow "rich" 
intervenors to receive compensation.86 The current statutory criteria 
applicable to the FTC are again claimed to be narrower and more 
desirable. To receive funds from the FTC, an applicant must be 
"unable effectively to particpate" because it "cannot afford to pay" 
the costs of participation,81 FTC regulations set forth several factors 
"" The requirement of an "adequate" presentation is imposed only to ensure presentations 
understandable by the decision-maker. 
" In practice, the FTC often looks beyond the "interest" represented by an applicant, 
basing its decision of eligibility on the applicant's actual "contribution to the record." Con-
versation with Bonnie Naradzay, Special Assistant for Compensation, Federal Trade Com-
mission (Nov. 18, 1976). The "substantial contribution" test of S. 2715 should be applied in 
a similarly realistic manner. Statutory language like that suggested in the text would explic-
itly direct all agencies to take such a functional approach. 
" S. 2715, Section Two, § (d)(2)(B) of the proposed APA § 558a. 
" [d. § (d)(2)(A) . 
.. Committee Report, supra note 15, at 19-20 . 
.. Cf. Operations Hearings, supra note 3, at 9 (statement of Sen. Allen) . 
.. Operations Hearings, supra note 3, at 9 (statement of Sen. Allen) and 57-8 (testimony 
of John Low). 
" 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975). 
1976] INTERVENOR COMPENSATION 711 
to be used in determining whether an applicant can afford to partic-
ipate, including the resources of the applicant, the costs of partici-
pation compared with the economic stake of the applicant's inter-
est, and the ability of the applicant to obtain contributions from 
other parties.88 The regulations also require an applicant to provide 
information relating to these three factors in its application.89 
Since the Committee Report calls upon agencies to look to 
"objective indicators" of an applicant's financial resources,90 and 
the agencies are granted authority by S. 2715 to establish regula-
tions to carry out its provisions,91 it follows that agencies will estab-
lish financial reporting requirements for applicants. Some may re-
quire more searching submissions than are currently required by the 
FTC. Thus administrative application of the first test of financial 
need under S. 2715 is not necessarily any more susceptible to abuse 
than the current FTC practice. 
Evaluation under the first test of the financial resources of an 
organization regularly engaged in advocacy before federal agencies 
poses a particularly difficult problem. On the one hand, agencies 
can demand that an organization in good faith allocate a portion of 
its funds for its advocacy activities. On the other hand, agencies 
must recognize that such groups are often capable of contributing 
to a greater number of proceedings than their budgets permit.92 
These considerations must be balanced in light of the overall goal 
of eliciting beneficial participation which, without compensation, 
would be unavailable. The Committee Report on S. 2715, accord-
ingly, instructs agencies to consider both the size of an applicant 
group's advocacy budget and the number of other proceedings in 
which it is engaged,93 but it warns that "it is not intended that a 
person must deplete its resources in order to qualify for an award."94 
Even if an applicant has substantial resources, it may be eligible 
for compensation under S. 2715 under the "economic stake" test 
discussed above. The FTC regulations contain a provision which 
would allow an award under similar circumstances. This test, mea-
OM 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(d)(l) (1976) . 
.. [d. § 1.17(c)(4). 
to Committee Report, supra, note 15, at 20. 
" S. 2715, Section Two, § (h)(l) of the proposed APA § 558a . 
• 2 See Administrative Hearings, supra note 3, at 44-48 (prepared statement of Peter Shuck, 
discussing the inability of Consumers Union to afford participation in numerous administra-
tive proceedings). 
'3 Committee Report, supra note 15, at 20 . 
.. [d. 
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suring "relative," as opposed to "absolute," economic need,95 recog-
nizes that the high costs of participation often pose such serious 
economic obstacles that even intervenors who are not impoverished 
are disinclined to participate. u6 When an awarding agency finds that 
such disinclination does in fact exist, it should award compensation 
if valuable participation will be elicited.u7 
C. Administration 
1. Timing of agency actions 
The timing of the decisions concerning applicant eligibility and 
amount of award and the timing of the actual disbursement of funds 
are important aspects of any system of agency compensation. Under 
S. 2715 decisions on eligibility and award must be made prior to the 
commencement of any proceeding, unless the agency makes an ex-
plicit written finding that a prospective decision is impracticable.9s 
Actual disbursement is to be made after a proceeding.99 If, however, 
an eligible intervenor shows that its ability to participate will be 
impaired unless it receives immediate funds, an agency must make 
advance payment to that intervenor. too 
Retrospective decisions concerning eligibility and amount of 
award have the advantage of allowing the awarding agency to evalu-
ate an intervenor's actual contribution to a proceeding. tOt However, 
few public intervenors can be expected to proceed in light of the risk 
that the very expenses which otherwise deter their participation will 
not be defrayed. t02 It would thus appear that prospective decisions 
on eligibility and amount of award are essential to promote wide-
spread public participation. S. 2715 so provides. 
Retrospective disbursement of funds is an effective safeguard 
against agency spending for contributions which never material-
'0 See Citizens VOICE Report, supra note 8, at 53. 
II See Committee Report, supra note 15, at 20 (giving example of telephone customers, no 
one of which has sufficient economic stake in a ratemaking proceeding to participate therein) . 
., Compensation will generally not be appropriate when an applicant would be willing to 
pay the costs despite a minute economic stake. Of course, the awarding agency must also 
consider whether an applicant qualifies for assistance under the other test of eligibility. See 
text at notes 92-94 supra . 
.. S. 2715, Section Two, § (0(1) of the proposed APA § 558a. 
II Id. § (0(2). 
'00 Id. § (f)(3). 
'0' Boasberg Report, supra note 18, at 174-77. 
'02 This point was made repeatedly by citizens groups at the Administrative Hearings, 
supra note 3, e.g., at 23 (testimony of Kathleen Bonk). 
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ize. lo3 Still, some groups will be unable to bear the costs of participa-
tion without actual advance funding, even if they know that com-
pensation awaits them at the end of the proceeding. lo4 By allowing 
actual payment in advance only upon a showing of need, S. 2715 
accommodates such impoverished groups, but leaves open the possi-
bility that groups who do receive advance funding will misuse this 
privilege. S. 2715 provides, however, that any group shall be liable 
for repayment of its award if it "clearly has not provided the repre-
sentation for which the . . . award was made" or has acted in an 
"obdurate, dilatory, mendatious or oppressive manner."I05 Although 
the groups receiving advance funding arguably will be those most 
unable to repay an award,l06 several factors ensure the program's 
integrity. First, any intervenor will recognize that serious injury to 
its reputaton as a responsible public advocate-and therefore to its 
ability to receive compensation in future proceedings-would result 
from being required to repay an advance award. Intervenors will 
accordingly make every reasonable effort to contribute significantly 
to a proceeding. Second, irresponsible groups with no concern for 
their reputation will probably be unable initially to convince the 
awarding agency that they can contribute to a proceeding, and will 
in any case be few in number.lo7 
Both agency and intervenor would benefit if the awarding agency 
were required by law to state, in its written determination of eligibil-
ity, the contribution which its expects the applicant to make. Such 
a requirement would ground any subsequent controversy over the 
intervenor's performance in a written record, eliminating the chance 
of mistaken expectation on both sides. Indeed, the FTC's regula-
tions call for the execution of an agreement between the Commis-
'03 Operations Hearings, supra note 3, at 47 (testimony of William Cuddy). 
'0' See Boasberg Report, supra note 18, at 174-75. 
, .. S. 2715, Section Two, § (0(4) of the proposed APA § 558a. Intervenors who have been 
declared eligible but have not received any money shall forfeit all or part of their awards 
upon the same grounds. [d. 
'01 Operations Hearings, supra note 3, at 10 (statement of Sen. Allen). 
117 The good faith of intervenors has been the subject of considerable disagreement. 
Compare Administrative Hearings, supra note 3, at 18 (statement by United States District 
Court Judge Charles Richey that intervenor groups are "among the finest that we have at 
the bar") with Operations Hearings, supra note 3, at 25 (statement by Joseph Swidler that, 
in order to obtain compensation, large, wealthy public-interest organizations "can always 
spin off a new group which could take the poverty oath."). In any case, the number of 
unprincipled, opportunistic intervenors will not be very large. The FrC has not encountered 
any significant problem of lack of good faith among its applicants. Conversation with Bonnie 
Naradzay, Special Assistant for Compensation, Federal Trade Commission (Nov. 18, 1976). 
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sion and any applicant setting forth "the terms and conditions of 
the compensation."108 
2. Computation of awards 
S. 2715 provides that awards for "reasonable attorneys' fees, ex-
perts' fees, and other costs of participation" shall be based on the 
"prevailing market rates for the kind and quality" of services fur-
nished. loB This is a familiar standard often employed by courts in 
fee-shifting cases. 110 Its use by administrative agencies disbursing 
money from their own coffers, however, raises the question of 
whether some maximum should be set on the hourly rates for attor-
neys' or experts' fees. The absence of a ceiling may invite abuse of 
the compensation program. III At the same time, the limit should not 
be set unrealistically low so that attorneys will, in effect, be finan-
cially penalized for representing public intervenors rather than 
more wealthy groupS.1I2 
The purpose of a system of agency compensation is to bring bene-
ficial public participation to as many administrative proceedings as 
possible. Whenever an award is made, therefore, it must be suffi-
cient to enable the intervenor to develop and present all of its infor-
mation and viewpoints in an understandable, effective fashion. As 
long as this condition is met for each proceeding, a ceiling on attor-
neys' and experts' rates would allow the agency to spread the lim-
ited amount of money available for compensation to a greater num-
ber of proceedings than would otherwise be possible. 
Indeed, the Committee Report on S. 2715 advocates a ceiling, 113 
but finds that "changing market and overall economic conditions" 
make it impossible to set fixed amounts that would be "equitable 
in all circumstances and in all sections of the country. "114 The report 
'''K 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(e)(1) (1976). 
"" S. 2715, Section Two, § (0(5) of the proposed APA § 558a. 
"' E.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd on other 
grounds, sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 521 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Lindy Bros. 
Builders Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167·68 (3d Cir. 
1973). Another common standard is that set forth in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 
U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (1970). See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 410 (M.D. Ala. 
1972). 
"' See Operations Hearings, supra note 3, at 58 (testimony of John Low). 
"' Administrative Hearings, supra note 3, at 50 (testimony of Tersh Boasberg) and 121 
(testimony of William Ruckelshaus). 
"' Committee Report, supra note 15, at 24·25. 
II. [d. at 25. 
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implies that by requiring that awards of attorneys' and experts' fees 
be "reasonable," S. 2715 intends to establish a limitation on the 
hourly rates. IIS This definition of the word "reasonable," however, 
is contrary to the intent apparent from the face of the statute. Thus, 
while the statutory standard of "[r]easonable attorneys' fees . . . 
based upon prevailing market rates" would seem to permit an 
award of $300 for two hours of work by a senior partner in a major 
urban law firm, the committee specifically intends that such a re-
sult be prevented. 118 
The fact that S. 2715 provides for an initial three-year experimen-
tal period should allay concern over the effect of changing economic 
conditions on the fairness of any specific limitation. Maximum 
hourly rates could be established which would ensure that a reason-
able variety of skilled attorneys and expert witnesses would be 
available to intervenors over the entire three-year period. 117 Regional 
variations in attorney and expert witness charges can be equitably 
accomodated by consideration of the "prevailing market rates" in 
various geographical areas. 
3. Identity of the awarding party 
Another important question to be asked concerning the adminis-
tration of a system of agency compensation is who shall determine 
the eligibility of applicants and the amounts of compensation to be 
awarded. An obvious choice. for this role is the presiding officer of 
each administrative proceeding,1I8 who is in an excellent position to 
evaluate the benefits of an intervenor's participation. However, 
there exists the danger that a short-sighted officer will bar interven-
ors through prejudgment ofthe case.1\9 Further, the presiding officer 
may be open to the charge of using his or her choice of intervenors 
deliberately to shape the conduct or outcome of a proceeding.120 If 
compensation decisions were made or subject to review by an inde-
pendent office within each agency,121 these problems might be elimi-
"' Id. 
III Id. at 24. 
117 These rates should not be equal to the highest prices which private practitioners com-
mand, but rather should be set only as high as necessary to provide intervenors a reasonable 
range of qualified attorneys and experts. 
11K See Boasberg Report, supra note 18, at 201-02 . 
• 11 Citizens VOICE Report, supra note 8, at 47 . 
• 21 Id . 
• %. A specific proposal for such an office at the FPC is set forth in Citizens VOICE Report, 
supra note 8. 
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nated. Such a system, however, would be costly and would add 
another bureaucratic layer to the agency's administrative structure. 
The FTC's current practice combines these approaches. 122 The 
presiding officer of a proceeding makes initial findings concerning 
the eligibility of applicants, and these findings are forwarded to the 
Director of the Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection for 
review and determination of the amounts to be awarded. In this way 
an existing agency office provides for review of the presiding officer's 
decisions without adding an expensive and cumbersome adminis-
trative appendage. 
A presiding officer should not have final control over who shall 
participate in a proceeding. Lacking sufficient appropriations to 
establish an office either to make compensation decisions or to re-
view those of the presiding officer, the agencies can use existing 
offices within their structures for this purpose. However, since not 
all agency structures will be adaptable, legislation on agency com-
pensation must explicitly attempt to deter abuse of the presiding 
officer's decision-making power in two other ways-by establishing 
clear standards for eligibility and by providing for judicial review of 
these decisions. 
D. Judicial Review 
The threshold issue concerning judicial review of agency compen-
sation decisions is whether such review should take place at all. 
Although intervenors' appeals will be costly to the agencies,123 this 
disadvantage can be mitigated by establishing a narrow standard 
for review of agency action, e.g., "abuse of discretion, "124 which will 
discourage such appeals. l25 Thus, while agencies will be allowed 
necessary discretion in making compensation decisions, an impor-
tant check will exist against gross misconduct on their part. S. 2715, 
in explicitly providing for judicial review of agency compensation, 128 
establishes narrow standards for that review. These standards, enu-
merated in § 706(2) of the APA127 are consistent with the need to 
check agency misconduct while maintaining desired flexibility. 128 
.22 16 C.F.R. § 1.17(d) (1976) . 
• 23 Agency Assistance, supra note 7, at 1836 . 
• 21 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970) . 
• 2. Agency Assistance, supra note 7, at 1836 . 
• 2. S. 2715, Section Two, § (g) of the proposed APA § 558a . 
• 27 See Committee Report, supra note 15, at 26 . 
• 2< 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970) states that a court shall: 
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The interrelated issues of the timing of, and the remedies avail-
able under, such judicial review, raise particularly difficult ques-
tions. A balance must be struck between protecting the orderly 
functioning of the administrative process and making timely, effec-
tive means of redress available to aggrieved intervenors. Prompt 
judicial review can be achieved by defining all agency compensation 
decisions as "final" and therefore immediately appealable,129 and 
effective vindication of an appellant's rights may require the review-
ing court to exercise jurisdiction over the underlying administrative 
proceeding for which compensation was sought. The administrative 
process can be protected by denying to appellant intervenors those 
remedies which would unreasonably interfere with the underlying 
administra ti ve proceeding. 
S. 2715, following this approach, provides for review of any agency 
action which denies an award or the payment of an award, which 
grants an award which is insufficient to enable an intervenor to 
participate effectively, or which actually pays to an intervenor an 
amount insufficient to compensate its participation yo However, S. 
2715 specifically prohibits all reviewing courts from entering an 
order to stay the underlying administrative proceeding in which the 
appellant had applied for compensation,131 thus avoiding the severe 
disruptive effect of a stayy2 If the underlying administrative pro-
ceeding is still in progress when a court decides an appeal in an 
aggrieved intervenor's favor, it will be sufficient to remand the case 
to the agency with directions to compensate the intervenor for its 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) 
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (e) in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance 
of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence [in those instances 
in which a hearing is required); (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts 
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing-court. 
Subsections (A) and (e) are those most likely to be involved in review of agency conpensation 
decisions. The narrowness of the "abuse of discretion" standard is clear. See K. DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.00 (1976). So long as the statute commits compen-
sation to agency discretion, courts can be expected to respect this legislative intent in review-
ing agency action under subsection (e). S. 2715 intends to allow for such discretion. See 
Operations Hearings, supra note 3, at 13 (testimony of Sen. Kennedy). 
'" Without such a definition, appeal of an agency's action concerning compensation would 
probably have to await the agency's substantive decision in the underlying proceeding. See 
generally Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
IJO S. 2715 Section Two, § (g) of the proposed APA § 558a. 
'" [d. 
132 See generally Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974). 
718 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:697 
participation. If, however, the underlying proceeding has been con-
cluded by the time the court reaches a decision, the appropriate 
remedy will be for the reviewing court to direct the agency to reopen 
the proceeding and incorporate into its substantive considerations 
the presentation for which the intervenor is entitled to receive com-
pensation.133 
E. Delay 
The possibility of administrative delay due to agency compensa-
tion presents another important matter for consideration. Two 
kinds of administrative delay which might be caused by agency 
compensation of intervenors have been invoked by critics of S. 
2715. 134 One type of delay results from the time spent in making 
agency decisions concerning eligibility and amount of award. Agen-
cies can minimize this time by developing streamlined procedures 
for compensation decisions. For example, agencies can develop 
standardized application forms, perhaps requiring a statement of 
financial resources made under oath. Significantly, the FTC has not 
experienced substantial delay in processing applications for com-
pensation, and the delay that has occurred is expected to diminish 
as the agency and the applicants become more accustomed to the 
compensation process. 135 
A second kind of delay might occur in the administrative proceed-
ings themselves when compensated intervenors participate. This 
delay would be caused in large part by intervenors pressing frivolous 
claims. The FTC has not encountered a substantial number of such 
intervenors. 138 In addition, well-designed criteria for eligibility, com-
bined with a statutory requirement that frivolous intervenors must 
forfeit or repay their awards, will avoid wasteful participation. Of 
course, some delay in administrative proceedings will result from 
the mere presence of a greater number of participants. Agencies can 
minimize this delay in several ways. Through modernization of their 
'33 Agencies are often directed by reviewing courts to amass a more complete record. C{. 
Webb v. Finch, 431 F.2d 1179,1180 (6th Cir. 1971); Kelley v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 1337, 
1344 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (agencies directed on remand to develop a more complete record, where 
participants' lack of counselor lack of effective counsel prevented this during the original 
proceedings). 
,3< Operations Hearings. supra note 3, at 18-19 (testimony of Joseph Swidler) and 46 (testi-
mony of William Cuddy). 
, •• Conversation with Bonnie Naradzay, Special Assistant for Compensation, Federal 
Trade Commission (Nov. 18, 1976). . 
'31 [d. 
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procedural rules, agencies could expedite parties' handling of mat-
ters both before and during administrative hearings. 137 Moreover, in 
making their decisions concerning eligibility and amount of award, 
agencies can deliberately avoid duplicative or superfluous presenta-
tions in a proceeding. The Committee Report on S. 2715 lists several 
"flexible approaches" to compensation which would serve this pur-
pose, including joint conpensation of applicants with similar contri-
butions. 138 Agencies could use the written determination of their 
reasons for an award to define the precise role an intervenor is al-
lowed to play in a proceeding. 139 
Even though increased delay will surely result from agency com-
pensation of intenvenors, it will be offset somewhat by the fact that 
increased public participation will cause the development of a more 
complete administrative record. Incomplete records often lead to 
judicially ordered rehearings of administrative proceedings-a 
source of considerable delay. 140 
CONCLUSION 
None of the issues discussed above can be resolved with complete 
ease. Some disadvantages accompany any legislative program. 
However, the preceding analysis shows that a system of agency 
compensation can be designed which minimizes these drawbacks 
and brings a wide range of beneficial public information and view-
points before administrative decision-makers. The statutory scheme 
established by S. 2715 represents such a system. Specific improve-
ments to that scheme have been suggested here-most importantly, 
the establishment of a standard for eligibility which directly tests 
the contribution of additional information or perspective which the 
potential intervenor might make. 
Direct agency compensaton of intervenors promises to achieve 
widespread, beneficial public participation in administrative pro-
ceedings. Such participation is needed to improve the quality of 
administration which so affects our lives, especially our environ-
ment. A statutory system along the lines outlined above would be a 
welcome development. 
IJ7 The FTC is in the process of modernizing its rules on discovery and compulsory process. 
41 Fed. Reg. 21793 (1976) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. Part 3). See also Murphy & Hoffman, 
supra note 3, at 399. 
13' Committee Report, supra note 15, at 21. 
13. See text at notes 107-08, supra. 
'"' Administrative Hearings, supra note 3, at 57 (testimony of Tersh Boasberg). 
